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S. Grossberg 
The organization of neocortex into layers is one of its most salient anatomical features. These 
layers include circuits that form functional columns in cortical maps. A major unsolved problem 
concerns how bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal interactions are organized within cortical 
layers to generate adaptive behaviors. This article models how these interactions help visual co1tex 
to realize: (I) the binding process whereby cortex groups distributed data into coherent object 
representations; (2) the attentional process whereby cortex selectively processes important events; 
and (3) the developmental and learning processes whereby cortex shapes its circuits to match 
environmental constraints. New computational ideas about feedback systems suggest how 
neocortex develops and learns in a stable way, and why top-down attention requires converging 
bottom-up inputs to fully activate cortical cells, whereas perceptual groupings do not. 
Introduction. The cerebral cortex is the seat of our highest forms of intelligence, and its 
understanding is thus a goal for all students of mind and brain. Neocortex has an intricate design 
which exhibits a characteristic organization into six distinct cortical layers (Brodmann, 1909; 
Martin, 1989). Differences in the thickness of these layers and the sizes and shapes of neurons led 
the German anatomist Korbinian Brodmann to identify more than fifty divisions, or areas, of 
neocortex. This classification has been invaluable to later scientists as a basis for discerning 
different functional roles for different parts of the brain. On the other hand, why the neocortex has 
six layers, or indeed a laminar design, has remained a mystery from a functional point of view. 
The present article proposes a model that provides clear functional roles for these layers for 
purposes of visual perception, and suggests that similar functional roles may be at work in all 
sensory and cognitive processing. 
Linking cortical anatomy to behavior cannot be done without a sufficiently powerful method. This 
is true because cortical organization exhibits multiple scales of processing, including individual 
neurons within the various layers, neural circuits that link these neurons within and between these 
layers, functional columns that are defined through these interlaminar interactions, cortical maps 
that are defined by the global organization of these columns within a cortical area, and 
thalamocortical and corticocortical interactions that occur between different thalamic and cortical 
areas. These cortical interactions, moreover, occur both bottom-up, from more peripheral to more 
central areas, and top-down, from more central to more peripheral areas, and have a characteristic 
laminar organization of their own. 
In order to make functional sense of such complex interactions, one needs to be able to link cortical 
organization to the behaviors that it controls; one needs to show how these designs lead to useful 
behavioral properties that have been selected and maintained through evolution. The present article 
describes such a linkage. It shows that perceptual, attentional, developmental, and learning 
properties that are known to be carried out by visual cortex place severe, and seemingly 
contradictory, demands on cortical organization. When one tries to realize all of these constraints 
within a single, unified cortical architecture, a model of how this is accomplished can be identified, 
whose every component is supported by neurobiological data. In addition to providing a unified 
explanation of many behavioral and neurobiological data for which no alternative explanation has 
yet arisen, this cortical model also makes a number of testable predictions. The constraints that will 
be described herein are all well-known. They have not been simultaneously applied before in part 
because they are usually studied experimentally by different groups of scientists, and also because 
their remarkably constraining nature does not become apparent until one attempts to model all of 
them at once. 
Perceptual Grouping and Attention: A Paradox. Some of the main constraints can be 
stated in terms of perceptual processes that are familiar to us all. During visual perception, the 
visual cortex can generate perceptual groupings and can focus attention upon objects of interest. 
Perceptual grouping is the process whereby the brain organizes image contrasts into emergent 
boundary structures that segregate objects and their backgrounds in response to texture, shading 
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and depth cues in scenes and images (Julesz, 1971; Ramachandran and Nelson, 1976; Beck, 
Prazdny, and Rosenfeld, 1983; Polat and Sagi, 1994). Perceptual grouping is a basic step in 
solving the "binding problem", whereby spatially distributed features are bound into 
representations of objects and events in the world. Illusory contours are a particularly vivid form of 
perceptual grouping. Figure 1 shows how an illusory contour can form over image positions that 
do not receive contrastive bottom-up inputs from an image or scene. Perceptual groupings can 
form preattentively and automatically, without requiring the conscious attention of a viewing 
subject. 
Attention enables humans and other animals to selectively process information that is of interest 
to them. In contrast to perceptual grouping, top-down attention does not form visible percepts over 
positions that receive no bottom-up inputs. Attention can sensitize, or prime, an observer to expect 
an object to occur at a given location, or with particular stimulus properties (Posner, 1980; 
Duncan, !984 ). But attention, by itself, is no substitute for the object's actual appearance. Were 
attention able to routinely generate fully formed perceptual representations, we could not tell the 
difference between external reality and internal fantasy. 
A B c 
Figure 1. An illusory Kaniza square can be perceived (A) colinear to edge inducers and (B) 
perpendicular to line-end inducers. (C) Model simulation of the latter type of boundary grouping 
(reprinted with permission from Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997). 
Given that perceptual grouping and attention make opposite requirements on bottom-up inputs, the 
question of how they are simultaneously realized within the same circuits of the visual cortex is a 
difficult one to answer. One possible answer to this question is that these circuits are not 
simultaneously realized within the same cortical areas. This answer is not, however, supported by 
recent cortical data. For example, it has been shown that short-range perceptual groupings can 
occur within cortical area VI (Redies, Crook, and Creutzfeldt, 1986; Grosof, Shapley, and 
Hawken, !993) and that longer-range perceptual groupings can occur within cortical area V2 (Von 
der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Peterhans and von der Heydt, 1989). In addition, 
attentional focussing occurs from the earliest visual cortical area VI top-down to the Lateral 
Geniculate Nucleus, or LGN (Sillito, Jones, Herstein, and West, 1994 ). Attention also operates in 
visual cortical areas VI, V2, and V4 (Motter, l994a, l994b; Reynolds, Nicholas, Chelazzi, and 
Desimone, 1995; Beauchamp, Cox, and DeYoe, 1997; Hupe et al., 1997; Ito, Westheimer, and 
Gilbert, 1997; Johnson and Burkhalter, 1997; Lamme, Zipser, and Spekreijse, 1997; McAdams 
and Maunsell, 1997; Press and van Essen, 1997) and areas MT and MST (O'Craven et al., 1997; 
Treue and Maunsell, 1997). Many recent neurophysiological experiments show that attentional 
processing operates throughout the visual cortex. 
2 
S. Grossberg 
Both perceptual grouping and attentional modulation are thus integrated within the visual cmtical 
areas VI and V2. How does this circuitry form perceptual groupings that can complete a boundary 
grouping over locations which receive no bottom-up visual inputs, whereas top-down attention 
cannot do so? Why should attention be deployed throughout the visual cortex, including cortical 
areas which previously were thought to accomplish purely preattentive processing? An answer can 
be found by exploring the link between attention and learning, and using this link to further 
constrain the model. 
The Link Between Attention and Learning. Earlier modeling work has suggested that top-
down attention is a key mechanism whereby the brain solves the stability-plasticity dilemma 
(Grossberg, 1980, 1982; Grossberg and Stone, 1986; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991, 1993; 
Grossberg, 1995; Grossberg and Merrill, 1996). The stability-plasticity dilemma concerns that fact 
that our brains can rapidly learn enormous amounts of information throughout life, without just as 
rapidly forgetting what they already know. Brains are plastic and can rapidly learn new 
experiences, without losing the stability that prevents catastrophic forgetting. 
The fact that multiple thalamic and cortical levels develop through experience-dependent learning 
(Hubel, Wiesel, and LeVay, 1977; Stryker and Harris, 1986; Calloway and Katz, 1990; Antonini 
and Stryker, 1993a, !993b; DeAngelis, Ohzawa, and Freeman, 1993; Ghose, Freeman, and 
Ohzawa, 1994; Galuske and Singer, 1996) raises the question of how such attentive processes 
may be realized within neocortex in order to stabilize this learning through time. This question, in 
turn, leads to further constraints on cortical design, because at least some perceptual groupings can 
form preattentively, and provide the substrate upon which higher-level attentional processes can 
act. How can the preattentive grouping mechanisms develop in a stable way, before any higher-
order attentional processes can develop with which to stabilize them? Why does not this problem 
lead to an infinite regress; namely, why is it not the case that attentional mechanisms cannot 
develop until preattentive mechanisms do, but preattentive mechanisms cannot develop stably in the 
absence of attention? I call this the attention-preattention intelface problem. It is an interface 
problem because it is shown below how laminar cortical circuits enable preattentive grouping 
processes to use some of the same circuitry that attentive mechanisms use, even before attentive 
mechanisms may come into play, in order to stabilize their own cortical development and learning. 
The solution proposed herein to the attention-preattention interface problem builds upon earlier 
efforts to solve the stability-plasticity dilemma. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, proposes a 
solution of how attention solves the stability-plasticity dilemma by modeling how bottom-up 
signals activate top-down expectations whose signals are matched against bottom-up data (Figure 
2A). Both the bottom-up and top-down pathways contain adaptive weights, or long-term memory 
traces, that may be modified by experience. The learned top-down expectations "focus attention" 
upon information that matches them (Figure 2B). They select, synchronize, and amplify the 
activities of cells within the attentional focus, while suppressing the activities of irrelevant cells, 
which could otherwise be incorporated into previously learned memories and thereby destabilize 
them. 
The cell activities which survive such top-down attentional focusing rapidly reactivate bottom-up 
pathways, thereby generating a type of feedback resonance between bottom-up and top-down 
signal exchanges (Figure 2A). Such resonances rapidly bind distributed information at multiple 
levels of brain processing into context-sensitive representations of objects and events. These 
resonances are proposed to support slower processes of learning; hence the name adaptive 
resonance. 
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Figure 2. (A) Patterns of activation, or short-term memory (STM), on a lower processing level 
send bottom-up signals to a higher processing level. These signals are multiplied by adaptive 
weights, or learned long-term memory (LTM) traces, which influence the activation of the cells at 
the higher processing level. These latter cells, in turn, activate top-town expectation signals that are 
also multiplied by learned LTM traces. These top-down expectations arc matched against the STM 
pattern that is active at the lower level. (B) This matching processes confirms and amplifies STM 
activations that are supported by large LTM traces in an active top-down expectation, and 
suppresses STM activations that do not get top-down support. The size of the hemidisks at the end 
of the top-down pathways represents the strength of the learned LTM trace that is stored in that 
pathway. (C) The ART Matching Rule may be realized by a top-down on-center off-surround 
network, as discussed in the text. 
ART has shown, using mathematical proofs and data explanations, how the learning of receptive 
field properties during early development, and the learning of perceptual and cognitive 
representations during adulthood, could easily suffer catastrophic forgetting in response to a 
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changing world (Grossberg, 1976a, 1976b; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987), and how top-down 
attention can stabilize learning if it satisfies four properties (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987, 
1991), which together are called the ART Matching Rule: 
Bottom-Up Automatic Activation: A cell, or cell population, can become active 
enough to generate output signals if it receives a large enough bottom-up input, other things being 
equal. Such an input can drive the cell to supraliminal levels of activation. 
Top-Down Priming: A cell becomes subliminally active if it receives only a large top-
down expectation input. Such a top-down priming signal can sensitize, or modulate, the cell, and 
thereby prepare it to react more quickly and vigorously to subsequent bottom-up inputs that match 
the top-down prime. The top-down prime by itself cannot, however, generate supraliminal output 
signals from the cell. 
Match: A cell becomes active if it receives large convergent bottom-up and top-down 
inputs. Such a matching process can generate enhanced activation as resonance takes hold. 
Mismatch: A cell's activity is suppressed, even if it receives a large bottom-up input, if it 
also receives only a small, or zero, top-down expectation input. 
ART originally proposed four related circuits that could all realize these properties (Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1987) and thereby stabilize the learning process. More recent data analyses have 
suggested that variants of the simplest circuit, a top-down on-center off-surround network (Figure 
2C), is used by the brain (Grossberg, 1995). Figure 2C clarifies how such a circuit can achieve all 
four properties. In particular, when only bottom-up signals are active, all cells can fire that receive 
large enough inputs. When only top-down attention is active, cells that receive inhibition but no 
excitation get inhibited, while cells that receive a combination of excitation and inhibition can get at 
most subliminally activated due to the balance between excitation and inhibition. When bottom-up 
and top-down inputs match, as in pathway 2 of Figure 2C, the two excitatory sources of excitation 
that converge at the cell can overwhelm the one inhibitory source; it is a case of "two-against-one." 
When bottom-up and top-down inputs mismatch, as in pathway I of Figure 2C, the top-down 
inhibition can neutralize the bottom-up excitation; it is a case of "one-against-one." 
Is Attention Too Slow and Weak to Matter? Many scientists have resisted the concept that 
top-down attention plays an important role, despite the fact that there arc massive top-down 
pathways throughout the cortex (Macchi and Rinvik, 1976; Tsumoto, Creutzfeldt, and Legendy, 
1978; van Essen and Maunscll, 1983; Felleman and van Essen, 1991), due to the belief that 
feedback cannot operate quickly enough to influence cortical information processing. Two 
mathematical properties of ART systems show such concerns to be groundless: First, cortical 
interactions that obey ART properties can choose the correct cells on the first pass of bottom-up 
signalling, if the input pattern is familiar to the system; second, resonance can stabilize within even 
a single processing cycle of attentional feedback (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987, 1991; 
Grossberg and Somers, 1991 ). 
Another roadblock to understanding derives from the properties, explained by ART, that top-down 
attention accomplishes subliminal, or subthreshold, priming and matching. By itself, it cannot 
supraliminally activate cells, thereby enabling them to generate output signals, and thus seems to be 
too "weak" to significantly affect cortical processing. For example, Zeki and Shipp (Zeki and 
Shipp, 1988, p. 316) wrote that "backward connections seem not to excite cells in lower areas, but 
instead influence the way they respond to stimuli". Likewise, the data of Sillito et al. (1994, pp. 
479-482) on attentional feedback from VI to LON led them to conclude that "the cortico-thalamic 
input is only strong enough to exert an effect on tbose dLGN cells that are additionally polarized by 
their retinal input...the feedback circuit searches for correlations that support the 'hypothesis' 
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represented by a particular pattern of cortical activity". Their experiments demonstrated all of the 
properties of the ART Matching Rule, since they found in addition that "cortically induced 
correlation of relay cell activity produces coherent firing in those groups of relay cells with 
receptive-field alignments appropriate to signal the particular orientation of the moving contour to 
the cortex ... this increases the gain of the input for feature-linked events detected by the cortex". In 
other words, top-down priming, by itself, cannot fully activate LGN cells; it needs matched 
bottom-up retinal inputs to do so; and those LGN cells whose bottom-up signals support cattical 
activity get synchronized and amplified by this feedback. In addition, anatomical studies have 
shown that the top-down VI to LGN pathway realizes a top-down on-center off-surround network 
(Dubin and Cleland, 1977; Weber, Kalil, and Behan, 1989), as in Figure 2. 
What Stabilizes Perceptual Development and Learning? The above discussion suggests 
that top-down attentional mechanisms should be present in every cortical area wherein learning 
can occur, since without top-down learned expectations that focus attention via the ART Matching 
Rule, any such learned memories could easily be degraded due to catastrophic forgetting. 
These analyses should, in particular, apply to the perceptual grouping process, because the cortical 
horizontal connections that support perceptual grouping in areas like VI develop through a learning 
process that is influenced by visual experience (Luhmann, Martinez Millan, and Singer, 1986; 
Calloway and Katz, 1991; Gilbert and Wiesel, 1992; Lowe! and Singer, 1992; Antonini and 
Stryker, 1993a; Galuske and Singer, 1996). It is also known that many developmental and 
learning processes, including those that control horizontal connections, are stabilized dynamically, 
and can be reactivated by lesions and other sources of cortical imbalance (Das and Gilbert, 1995; 
Gilbert and Wiesel, 1992), and that adult learning uses the same types of mechanisms as the infant 
developmental processes upon which it builds (Bailey et al., 1992; Kandel and O'Dell, 1992; 
Mayford et al., 1992). What cortical mechanisms ensure this type of dynamical stability? 
This is a particularly challenging problem for the case of perceptual groupings for two reasons 
which, on the surface, seem to be unrelated, but which will turn out to be intimately related on a 
mechanistic level. The first reason is that perceptual groupings can form preattentively. How, 
then, can attention control their stability during infant development and adult learning? This is the 
attel!lion-preattention inteJ:fclce problem that was mentioned above. The second reason, also 
noted above, is that perceptual groupings can form over positions that do not receive bottom-up 
inputs, as in the case of illusory contours. They therefore seem to violate the ART Matching Rule. 
How, then, can the horizontal connections that generate perceptual groupings maintain themselves 
in a stable way? Why are they not washed away whenever a grouping forms over positions that do 
not receive a bottom-up input? 
My proposed answer to this question unifies two types of neural models which have been 
developed along separate paths for two decades: the attentive ART model, and the preattentive 
perceptual grouping model that is called the Boundary Contour System, or BCS (Grossberg and 
Mingolla, 1985; Grossberg, 1994; Gove, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1995). Until the present, it 
has not been possible to understand how ART circuits are embodied within the laminar architecture 
of visual cortex. Recent work on the BCS has suggested how preattentive grouping may be carried 
out by laminar visual cortex. My proposed synthesis of how attention, perceptual grouping, 
development, and perceptual learning are realized by the laminar circuits of visual cortex builds 
upon this new foundation. The present article focuses on one combination of intracortical and 
intercortical pathways. It does not attempt to model all cortical connections, or the variations that 
exist across species. Preliminary studies indicate, however, that the principles modeled herein can 
be elaborated and adapted to handle these cases. 
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Analog Coherence of Perceptual Groupings. This BCS model proposes how the laminar 
circuitry of visual cortex enables perceptual groupings to maintain their analog and spatial context-
sensitivity in response to changes in stimulus properties (Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, I 997). 
Analog sensitivity means that perceptual groupings can alter their form in response to graded 
changes in stimulus properties. For example, one boundary grouping, such as an illusory contour, 
may form if some signals are weak and others strong, whereas a different grouping may form if 
the reverse relative signals strengths occur. Spatial context-sensitivity means that the cortex can 
respond flexibly to spatial rearrangements of the stimuli that are to be grouped. 
The grouping process actively selects and binds together the most salient groupings for conscious 
perception, while suppressing less salient groupings. This selection, or binding, process endows 
each grouping with an inner coherence, so that object representations are not merely the sum of 
their features. Unfortunately, processes that select winning groupings while inhibiting losing 
groupings tend to wipe out analog sensitivity; they tend to generate binary outcomes. Because 
analog values carry useful information about objects and events, it is important to understand how 
the cortex can bind distributed information into coherent representations without a loss of analog 
sensitivity. Remarkably, the laminar circuitry of visual cortex is capable of robustly realizing the 
key property of analog coherence whereby groupings form coherently without losing analog or 
spatial context-sensitivity. 
Four Pt·eattentive Designs of Visual Cortex. Four circuit properties summarize this 
proposal of how the visual cortex, notably areas VI and V2, uses its laminar design to generate 
perceptual groupings that preserve analog coherence. Each design principle will be described along 
with cortical data that it explains. Then four more circuit properties will be proposed whereby 
attention, development, and learning are integrated into this laminar design. 
Design 1. Analog Sensitivity to Bottom-Up Sensory Inputs. Bottom-up inputs 
from the retina go through the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) on their way to cortex. LGN 
outputs directly excite layer 4 (Rubel and Wiesel, 1962; Chapman, Zahs, and Stryker, 1991; Reid 
and Alonso, I 995). LGN inputs also excite layer 6, which then indirectly influences layer 4 via an 
on-center off-surround network of cells (Ferster and Lindstrom, 1985; Grieve and Sillito, 199Ia, 
1991 b, 1995), as in Figure 3A. The net effect of LGN inputs on layer 4 cells is thus via an on-
center off-surround network. Such a feedforward on-center off-surround network of cells can 
preserve the analog sensitivity of, and normalize, the activities of target cells if these cells obey the 
membrane equations of neurophysiology (Grossberg, 1973, 1980; Douglas et al., 1995). In the 
present case, such a network preserves the analog sensitivity of layer 4 cells in response to LGN 
inputs that may vary greatly in intensity. 
Design 2. Bipole Boundary Grouping. The active layer 4 cells input to pyramidal 
cells in layer 2/3. These cells initiate the formation of perceptual groupings. They generate 
excitatory signals among themselves using monsynaptic long-range horizontal connections, and 
inhibition using short-range disynaptic inhibitory connections (Hirsch and Gilbert, 199 I; McGuire 
et al., 1991 ), as in Figure 3B. These interactions support inward perceptual groupings between 
two or more boundary inducers (von der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Peterhans and 
von der Heydt, 1989), but not outward groupings from a single inducer (Hirsch and Gilbert, 199I; 
Cannon and Fullenkamp, 1993; Knierim and van Essen, 1992; Somers, Nelson, and Sur, 1995; 
Stemmler, Usher, and Niebur, 1995), as in the case of illusory contours (Figure 1). If a single 
inducer could generate groupings, our percepts would become crowded with webs of boundaries 
that spread out from every feature in a scene. 
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Figure 3. A model circuit of retinal, lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), and cortical Vl 
interactions: Open symbols indicate excitatory interactions and closed symbols inhibitory 
interactions. (A) Feedforward circuit from retina to LGN to cortical layers 4 and 6: Retina: Retinal 
ON cells have an on-center off-surround organization. Retinal OFF cells have an off-center on-
surround organization. LGN: The LGN ON and OFF cells receive feedforward ON and OFF cell 
inputs from the retina. Layer 4: Layer 4 cells receive feedforward inputs from LGN and layer 6. 
LGN ON and OFF cell excitatory inputs to layer 4 directly establish oriented simple cell receptive 
fields. Layer 6 cells excite layer 4 cells with a narrow on-center and inhibit them using inhibitory 
interneurons that span a broader off-surround. Like-oriented layer 4 simple cells with opposite 
contrast polarities compete (not shown) before generating half-wave rectified outputs that converge 
on layer 2/3 pyramidal (complex) cells. Layer 2/3: The converging simple cell outputs enable 
complex cells to respond to both polarities. They hereby full-wave rectify the image. [Figure 
caption continued on next page.] 
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Figure 3 Continued. (B) Horizontal grouping interactions in layer 2/3: After being activated by 
inputs from layer 4, layer 2/3 pyramidal (complex) cells excite each other monosynaptically via 
horizontal connections, primarily on their apical dendrites. They also inhibit one another via 
disynaptic inhibition that is mediated by model smooth stellate cells. Multiple horizontal 
connections share a common pool of stellate cells near each target pyramidal cell. This ensures that 
boundaries form inwardly between pairs or greater numbers of boundary inducers, but not 
outwardly from a single inducer. (C) Cortical feedback loop from Layer 2/3 to Layer 6: Layer 6 
cells receive excitatory inputs from layer 2/3. The long-range cooperation hereby engages the 
feedforward layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network, which then reactivates layer 2/3 cells. 
This "folded feedback" loop can select winning groupings without a loss of analog coherence. (D) 
Outputs from layer 2/3 to area V2 directly excite layer 4 cells and layer 6 cells, which indirectly 
influence layer 4 cells via an on-center off-surround network, as in area V 1. 
These grouping properties are ensured in the following way: When a single active pyramidal cell 
sends horizontal monosynaptic excitation to other pyramidal cells, this excitation is inhibited by the 
disynaptic inhibition that it also generates; this is another case of "one-against-one". A different 
result obtains when two or more pyramidal cells are activated at positions that are located at 
opposite sides of a target pyramidal cell, and all the cells are approximately colinear across space. 
Then the excitation from the active pyramidal cells summates at the target cell, thereby generating a 
larger total excitatory input than a single pyramidal cell could. In addition, the active cells all excite 
a single population of disynaptic inhibitory interneurons, which generates a saturating, or 
normalized, inhibitory output to the target cell. Thus excitation is bigger than inhibition in this case, 
so that grouping can occur; it is another case of "two-against-one." This combination of constraints 
is called the hipole property. Layer 2/3 pyramidal cells may hereby become active either due to 
direct inputs from layer 4, or due to bipole boundary groupings that form in response to other 
active layer 2/3 cells. 
Design 3. Folded Feedback and Analog Coherence. The active cells in layer 2/3 
send excitatory feedback signals to layer 6 via layer 5 (Gilbert and Wiesel, 1979; Ferster and 
Lindstrom, 1983), as in Figure 3C. Layer 6, in turn, once again activates the on-center off-
surround network from layer 6 to 4. This feedback process is called j(;lded feedback, because 
feedback signals from layer 2/3 to layer 6 get transmitted in a feedforward fashion back to layer 4. 
The feedback is hereby "folded" back into the feedforward flow of bottom-up information within 
the laminar cortical circuits. 
Folded feedback turns the cortex into a feedback network that binds the cells throughout layers 2/3, 
4, and 6 into functional columns (Mountcastle, 1957; Rubel and Wiesel, 1962, 1977). The on-
center off-surround network helps to select the strongest groupings that are formed in layer 2/3 
and to inhibit weaker groupings, while preserving the analog values of the selected groupings. In 
particular, the on-center signals from layer 6-to-4 support the activities of those pyramidal cells in 
layer 2/3 that are part of the strongest horizontal groupings. The off-surround signals inhibit inputs 
to layer 4 that were supporting less active groupings in layer 2/3. In this way, signals from layer 4 
to the less active groupings in layer 2/3 are removed, and thus these groupings collapse. 
Design 4. Self-Similar HiHarchical Boundat·y Processing. Converging 
evidence suggests that area V2 replicates the structure of area VI, but at a larger spatial scale 
(Kisvarday et al., 1995). In particular, layer 2/3 in area V 1 sends bottom-up inputs to layers 4 and 
6 of area V2, much as LON sends bottom-up inputs to layers 4 and 6 of area VI (van Essen and 
Maunsell, 1983; Felleman and van Essen, 1991); see Figure 3D. This input pattern from VI to V2 
can preserve the analog sensitivity of layer 4 cells in V2 for the same reason that the LON inputs to 
VI can preserve the analog sensitivity of layer 4 cells in VI. The shorter perceptual groupings in 
layer 2/3 of area VI (Redies, Crook, and Creutzfeldt, 1986; Grosof, Shapley, and Hawken, 1993) 
are proposed to group together, and thereby enhance the signal-to-noise ratio of, nearby VI cells 
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with similar orientation and disparity selectivity. The longer perceptual groupings in area V2 (van 
der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Peterhans and von der Heydt, 1989) are proposed 
to build long-range boundary segmentations that separate figure-from-background; generate 3-D 
groupings of the edges, textures, shading, and stereo information that go into object 
representations; and complete boundaries across gaps in bottom-up signals due to the retinal blind 
spot and veins (Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg and McLoughlin, 1997). Both types of groupings 
achieve analog coherence by using the same type of laminar circuitry. Computer simulations of 
such groupings are reported elsewhere (Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997). 
A B c 
V2 6 V2 6 Vl 6 
1 ! 000 4 lGN 0 0 ltl Vl Vl 5 
6 6 
Figure 4. (A) Top-down corticogeniculate feedback from Layer 6: LGN ON and OFF cells 
receive topographic excitatory feedback from layer 6 in VI, and more broadly distributed inhibitory 
feedback via LGN inhibitory interneurons that are excited by layer 6 signals. The feedback signals 
pool outputs over all cortical orientations and are delivered equally to ON and OFF cells. 
Cortiogeniculate feedback selects, gain-controls, and synchronizes LGN cells that are consistent 
with the cortical activation that they cause, thereby acting like a type of automatic attentional focus. 
(B) Attentional feedback from V2to VI: Layer 6 in V2 activates layer 6 in VI, which then activates 
the layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network that attentionally primes layer 4 cells. (C) One 
feedback pathway arises from Layer 6 cells in V2 and activates apical dendrites in Layer 1 of V 1. 
Cells in Layer 5 are activated through these apical dendrites and thereupon activate Layer 6 cells. 
Four Attentive Designs of Visual Cortex. How does top-down attention fit into these 
layered circuits without disturbing the preattentive grouping process? Four attentive design 
principles are proposed to accomplish this, and to enable cortical development and learning to 
proceed in a stable fashion. 
Design 5. Top-Down Feedback from Vl to LGN. As noted above, layer 6 of area 
V1 sends a top-down on-center off-surround network to the LGN (Murphy and Sillito, 1987; 
Weber, Kalil, and Behan, 1989; Murphy and Sillito, 1996), as in Figure 4A. This top-down 
pathway automatically focuses attention on those LGN cells whose activities succeed in activating 
VI cells. Data of Sill ito eta/. (1994) show that this feedback obeys the ART Matching Rule, and 
thus can only subliminally activate, or modulate, LGN cells. Matched bottom-up inputs are needed 
to supraliminally activate LGN cells while top-down signals are active. This process is predicted to 
help stabilize the development of disparity-tuned complex cells in VI during the visual critical 
period. 
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Design 6. ·Folded Feedback from Layer 6 of V2 to Layer 4 of Vl. A variant of 
this top-down process seems to occur at all stages of visual cortex, and probably beyond. Layer 6 
in a given cortical area, such as V2, generates top-down cortical signals to layer 6 of lower coitical 
areas, such as V1, where they activate the layer 6-to-4 folded feedback network in the lower area 
(Figure 4B). One such known top-down pathway exits layer 6 in V2 and activates VI via layer 1 
(Pandya and Yeterian, 1985). This pathway activates layer 1 apical dendrites of layer 5 cells, 
which relay them to layer 6 cells in V1 (Cauller and Connors, 1994; Rockland, 1994), as in Figure 
4C. Top-down feedback hereby activates a top-down on-center off-surround circuit, much like the 
ART circuit in Figure 2. I propose that it is realized in cortex using outputs from layer 6 of a given 
cortical area to activate layer 4 of a lower cortical area via layer 6-to-4 folded feedback. This 
proposal is supported by neurophysiological data showing that top-down signals activate the 
center and inhibit the surround of area VI cells (Bullier et al., 1996). 
Design 7. Layer 6-to-4 Signals are Subliminal. The ART Matching Rule predicts 
that this top-down pathway subliminally activates, or modulates, cells in layer 4. I propose that 
this subliminal property is due to the fact that the on-center off-surround interactions from layer 6-
to-4 are balanced so that at most a weak excitatory effect occurs after activating the circuit via top-
down feedback. This hypothesis is consistent with neurophysiological data from ferret visual 
cortex showing that the layer 6-to-4 circuit is functionally weak (Wittmer, Dalva, and Katz, 1997). 
In addition, Hupe et al. (1997, p. 1031) note: "feedback connections from area V2 modulate but 
do not create center-surround interactions in VI neurons." Thus top-down feedback from layer 6 
of V2 is predicted to be able to supraliminally activate layer 6 of VI but not layer 4 of V1. 
This functional "weakness" does not prevent the top-down circuit from having a major effect on 
cortical cell activations when the cortex is activated bottom-up by visual inputs. In particular, by 
inhibiting activities of layer 4 cells whose layer 2/3 cell projections are not bound into strong 
groupings, the layer 6-to-4 circuit can dramatically change the balance of activation across the 
cortex, thereby enabling the strongest groupings to become amplified and resonant. This analysis 
predicts that attentional and grouping constraints from higher levels of cortex can feed back to 
selectively bias the groupings that arise at lower cortical levels. In particular, the "higher-order" 
boundary completion and figure-ground perception grouping properties of V2 can select cells in V 1 
which are consistent with them. 
Design 8. Two Bottom-Up Input Sources to Layer 4. A simple functional 
explanation can now be provided of why there are direct bottom-up inputs to layer 4, as well as 
indirect bottom-up inputs to layer 4 via layer 6, in many cortical areas (e.g., Figures 3A and 3D). 
Why are not these two separate input pathways redundant? Why, in particular, is not the indirect 
layer 6-to-4 pathway sufficient to activate layer 4 cells and to maintain their analog sensitivity 
using its on-center off-surround network? The proposed explanation is that direct inputs to layer 4 
are needed to supraliminally activate layer 4 cells, since the indirect layer 6-to-4 inputs, being 
subliminal, cannot do so. 
Taken together, these eight cortical design principles lead to the circuit diagram for perceptual 
grouping and attention between LGN, VI, and V2 that is shown in Figure 5. I propose that the 
same cortical circuits may explain data at multiple levels of cortical organization; for example, they 
are sufficient to explain attentional data collected from macaque cortical areas V2 and V4 (Motter, 
1994a, 1994b; Reynolds et al., 1995), wherein top-down attention once again selectively primes 
features within the attentional focus while suppressing the effects of features that are not. 
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2/3 
V2 
4 
6 
2/3 
Vl 
4 
6 
LGN 
Figure 5. A model synthesis of bottom-up , top-down, and horizontal interactions in LGN, 
Vl , and V2. Cells and connections in green denote preattentive excitatory mechanisms that are 
involved in perceptual grouping. Red denotes inhibitory mechanisms. Blue denotes top-down 
attentional mechanisms. 
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Stable Cortical Development and Adult Learning. With the circuit of Figure 5 in mind, 
we can return to the fundamental question of how the horizontal connections within cortical area 
VI develop through a learning process that is modifiable by visual inputs. How is such 
development stabilized through time? 
A simple and parsimonious answer can now be given, because both preattentive perceptual 
groupings within VI and attentive feedback from V2 to VI both generate feedback signals to layer 
6 of VI. Both types of feedback activate the folded feedback circuit from layer 6-to-4. Top-down 
attention uses this circuit to focus attention within VI by inhibiting layer 4 cells that are not 
supported by excitatory 6-to-4 feedback. Perceptual grouping uses it to inhibit layer 4 cells that 
would otherwise help to form incorrect groupings. In so doing, folded feedback prevents the 
wrong combinations of cells in layers 4 and 2/3 from being active simultaneously, and thereby 
prevents incorrect horizontal connections from being learned between these active cells. 
The folded feedback circuit from layer 6-to-4 gets activated by perceptual grouping signals from 
layer 2/3-to-6 at all positions of the grouping, even those positions that do not receive bottom-up 
inputs. The ART Matching Rule is thus satisfied at all such positions, and the source of the "top-
down expectation" is the perceptual grouping itself. In summary, the preattentive perceptual 
grouping is its own attentional prime (Figure 6). 
2/3 
4 
6 
Figure 6. The preattentive perceptual grouping IS Its own attentional prime: An intracortical 
perceptual grouping, such as an illusory contour, uses [Figure caption continued on next page.] 
13 
S. Grossberg 
Figure 6 Continued. the same layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network as does intercoitical 
attentional priming. Its off-surround can hereby inhibit incorrect layer 4 cells that could otherwise 
enter into incorrect associations with active layer 2/3 cells. This mechanism works at all positions 
of the grouping, even those that do not receive bottom-up inputs. 
Model simulations of how cortical area VI develops its horizontal connections in layer 2/3 and its 
interlaminar connections between layers 6 and 4 have demonstrated that stable development can be 
achieved if the on-center off-surround circuits from layer 6-to-4 subliminally activate layer 4 cells 
(Grossberg and Williamson, 1997). When this constraint is not realized, it is much harder to 
stabilize development in the model. By extension, these results suggest how perceptual learning in 
the adult can be stabilized using the same mechanisms. 
Some Predictions. Many predictions are implicit in the cortical design principles that are 
proposed above, since each one predicts a functional role for a known cortical circuit. Some 
patticularly worthwhile tests would be: (1) test if top-down VI to LGN feedback plays a role in 
stabilizing the development of disparity tuning during the visual critical period; (2) test if top-down 
feedback from V2 to VI can supraliminally activate layer 6 cells, but only subliminally activate 
layer 4 cells; (3) test if a long-range horizontal grouping in layer 2/3 of V2 can inhibit vertically 
oriented simple cells at the midpoint of this grouping in layer 4 of Vl; ( 4) test if layer 4 simple cells 
cannot be supraliminally activated if only the LGN-to- 6-to-4 input pathway is active. Each of these 
predictions is technically difficult to test, but as increasingly selective methods are developed (e.g., 
Nelson et al., 1994), this will become easier to do. 
Many additional tests of the model can be envisaged. Another test incorporates habituative or 
depressing synapses (Abbott, Varela, Sen, and Nelson, 1997; Grossberg, 1969, 1976b, 1980). 
Several earlier mticles have used the hypothesis that habituative synapses may exist in the spatial 
competition stage that occurs prior to bipole grouping, in order to explain psychophysical data 
about visual persistence, perceptual aftereffects, and residual traces (Francis and Grossberg, 
1996a, 1996b; Francis, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1994). In the present laminar model of cortex, 
such synapses may be interpreted to occur in the layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network. If 
this hypothesis is correct, then the following type of experiment, along with variants thereof, may 
be of interest. First, use direct electrical stimulation of area V2 to generate, say, a horizontally 
oriented top-down priming signal to layer 6 of area VI. If such a signal generates suprathreshold 
output signals from layer 6, then they should be able to habituate the synapses in the layer 6-to-4 
on-center off-surround network. This habituative effect may then be tested with bottom-up 
horizontal and vertical visual stimuli to the same location. If the top-down habituative effect works 
in the same manner as a prior bottom-up adaptation stimulus (Meyer, Lawson, and Cohen, 1975), 
then persistence of cell responses in layers 2/3 and 4 will be Jess with a horizontal stimulus and 
greater with a vertical stimulus than it would have been in the absence of the top-down habituative 
prime. Such a test would exploit the hypotheses that both the intercortical top-down priming circuit 
and the bottom-up activation circuit utilize the same layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network, 
and that habituative synapses exist in this network. A related test in area V2 would habituate the 
layer 6-to-4 horizonally oriented synapses in the middle of an illusory contour and would then do 
the same horizontal and vertical persistence test as described above. This test would exploit the 
hypotheses that intracortical feedback signals from layer 2/3 of V2 and feedforward signals from 
area VI to V2 utilize the same layer 6-to-4 on-center off-surround network, and that habituative 
synapses exist in this network. Taken together, experiments such as these would provide further 
information about how every preattentive perceptual grouping becomes its own attentional prime. 
Learning, Attention, and Grouping in Sensory and Cognitive Neocortex. The 
present article suggests how bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal interactions are organized within 
visual cortical areas VI and V2. The key impediment to making this synthesis in the past derived 
from an absence of hypotheses about how the cortex uses the folded feedback circuit from layer 6-
to-4 to achieve both top-down attentional priming and analog coherence of preattentive perceptual 
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groupings. The hypothesis that this priming circuit obeys the ART Matching Rule enables all 
previous results about how ART interactions stabilize development and learning to be applied to the 
case of cortical development and adult perceptual learning. Many data about preattentive grouping 
of information, attentive priming of information, infant development, and adult learning may now 
be functionally linked to the laminar, columnar, and map organization of the visual cortex. This is 
true, for example, of recent neurophysiological data which have supported the key ART 
predictions that many developmental and learning processes are stabilized dynamically using 
learned top-down expectations, and that adult learning uses the same types of mechanisms as the 
infant developmental processes upon which it builds. These data include: shared molecular 
substrates of neonatal development and adult learning (Bailey et al., 1992; Kandel and O'Dell, 
1992; Mayford et al., 1992); attentional modulation of cortical development (Singer, 1982); 
plasticity of adult cortical representations after lesions (Merzenich et al., 1988); dynamical 
reorganization of long-range connections in the visual cortex (Gilbert and Wiesel, 1992; Zohary e t 
al., 1994); fast perceptual learning in the adult (Karni and Sagi, 1991; Poggio, Fahle, and 
Edelman, 1992); and fast cortical synchronization (Eckhorn et al., 1988; Gray and Singer, 1989). 
Given the generality of the functional problems that these circuits are proposed to solve, it seems 
plausible that similar circuits may be used throughout the neocortex. Indeed, ART models have 
already been used, albeit without a laminar cortical interpretation, to explain developmental, 
cognitive, and neurobiological data about normal and amnesic recognition learning, categorization, 
working memory, memory search, and hypothesis testing (Grossberg, 1980, 1982; Grossberg and 
Stone, 1986; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991, 1993; Grossberg, 1995; Grossberg and Merrill, 
1996; Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen, 1997). In many of these cognitive examples, an 
orienting system, which has been proposed to be at least partly realized in the hippocampal system, 
interacts with the attentional thalamocortical circuits that do the learning. This interaction drives 
hypothesis testing, or memory search, for new, or more task-appropriate, recognition categories 
within the attentional system. Such an orienting system enables attention to be allocated in a more 
flexible way than can be achieved by the attentional mechanisms on their own, and permits an 
enormous expansion in the amount of information that can be learned. In this regard, long-range 
intrinsic connections are also known to occur in many areas of neocortex; for example, in the 
auditory and language areas of the human temporal cortex (Schmidt eta!., 1997). It remains to be 
seen whether these model circuits generalize to show how other sensory and cognitive regions of 
the neocortex are functionally organized. 
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